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ESSAYS
WHO WANTS TO BRING THE GOOD
OLD MILITARY INTO THE WAR ON
DRUGS IN BOLIVIA?t
Jaime Malamud Gotitt
In 1988, Bolivia passed and implemented a strong anti-nar-
cotics law.1 The law was designed to help eradicate the flow of
narcotics from the South American continent and has been suc-
cessful, to some measure.
Bolivia has made a remarkable transition during this decade
from a trafficker-influenced military regime to a democratic gov-
ernment with a coca eradication program. Our certification deci-
sion is based on the fact that the 1988 record is the best annual
performance to date . . . [They] exceeded the 1,800 hectare
eradication target spelled out in our bilateral narcotic agreement
signed in 1987 and began forcible eradication . . . . However, de-
spite these efforts, total coca cultivation continued to increase
t This article is based, in large part, on interviews conducted by the author
throughout the Bolivian countryside. Many of the persons interviewed wish to remain
unidentified for obvious reasons. We respect the author's wish to keep these identities
confidential and have not included them in the applicable footnotes herein.
tt Senior Human Rights advisor to President Alfonsin and Coordinator of Argen-
tina's drug policy from 1983 to 1987; Solicitor to the Argentine Supreme Court from
1987-88. I take this opportunity to express my thanks to the Harry-Frank Guggenheim
Foundation and particularly to Karen Colvard, program officer. I am endebted to United
States Ambassador in La Paz Robert Gelbard, and to Argentine ambassador in La Paz
Eduardo Iglesias.
International Narcotics Control: The President's March 1, 1989 Certification for
Foreign Assistance Eligibility and Options for Congressional Action. Under this law,
leading trafficker Roberto Suarez was arrested and remains in prison. Interdiction efforts
were improved leading to a sharp increase in the number of drug seizures. In addition,
the riverine interdiction program, problematic throughout the year, appears back on
track with the government of Bolivia's appointment of a new, highly professional navy
commander in December, 1988. Id.
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and high prices for coca leaf are hurting the voluntary eradication
program .. . .In sum, we think Bolivia made a good effort in
1988, but increased production is particularly worrisome and
more must be done to deter the spread of coca cultivation.'
The extent of Bolivia's involvement in the cultivation of coca is,
perhaps, better understood in terms of dollars versus hectares.
"Bolivia and Peru between them grow almost all the world's
coca leaf. La Paz government officials have estimated that drugs
bring Bolivia 1.6 billion dollars a year, of which 600 million dol-
lars goes to about 400,000 people involved in coca cultivation."'
Although millions of dollars are being spent to eradicate the
narcotics plague, the "war on drugs" has incurred its own casu-
alties. What happens when compelling interests in human rights
conflicts with the compelling interest in controlling the flow of
narcotics?
I. THE DRUG PROBLEM: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
In July 1988, I made a visit to Bolivia's Chapare region as
the envoy of Argentinean President Alfonsin. The second largest
coca producing area in the world after the Upper Huallaga Val-
ley in Peru, the Chapare stretches a hundred miles north of the
town of Cochabamba.4 At a high, inhospitable cold spot in the
mountains between Cochabamba and the coca plantations, there
is a police checkpoint where vehicles are thoroughly searched for
the tools used in the manufacture of cocaine paste. Presumably
to satisfy my curiosity, the police officer in charge ushered me
into the shed where they stored the seized items. Among those
2 Id.
' Zeballos, Bolivia President to Ask Bush for Help in Drug Fight, Reuters Library
Report, Reuters Wire Service, May 6, 1990.
' Estimates about the size of coca and cocaine production in Bolivia vary dramati-
cally from author to author; even official Bolivian and foreign agencies have different
figures. Oporto Castro and Campodonico agree as the extent of the cultivation: about
70,000 hectares of coca have been grown in Bolivia, and the country's cocaine yield
amounts to about 132,400 tons of leaf. The yield of Bolivian coca leaf lies between
100,000 and 150,000 tons. 100 kilos of leaf yields 4 to 4.5 tons of coca paste. About 50
percent of the volume of this coca paste is lost when it is refined into cocaine hydrochlo-
ride. See H. Opporto Castro, Bolivia: El Complejo Coca-cocaina, in COCA, COCAINA Y
NARCOTRAFIco: LABAERINTO EN Los ANDES 171 (Comision Andina de Juristas ed.
1989)[hereinafter Comision Andina report]. See also, H. Campodonicd', La Politica del
Aveztruz, supra Comision Andina report at 223.
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articles stored in the depot were those of the most common na-
ture: toilet paper, kerosene lanterns, plastic sheets and car bat-
teries. According to the policeman, these articles are essential to
the illicit drug industry. The kerosene in the lanterns, for in-
stance, is a good solvent to detach the cocaine contained in the
coca leaves. Toilet paper is used to dry the paste.
Somehow my memory got caught in that police shed. An en-
forcement campaign that required the interdiction of toilet pa-
per seemed not only an intrusion into the basic needs of the in-
habitants of the Chapare, but also doomed to fail from its
inception. A police force that devotes itself to the interception of
such basic elements in the life of a South American community
devoid of running water and electricity is also necessarily di-
rected against the community itself.
This article addresses the issue of the plight of the poor,
resourceless sector of the Bolivian economy which finds itself
caught in the war on drugs: the coca growers and stompers.5 It
attempts to demonstrate that the war on drugs in Bolivia has
deepened already existing conflicts between sectors of the Boliv-
ian government such as the army and the police.' The main
' The profits of the cocaine trade in Bolivia exceed 2.5 billion dollars. These profits,
however, benefit only a few. It has been conjectured that around two hundred families in
Bolivia collected between 80 percent and 90 percent of the global amounts the country's
cocaine crop yielded in 1985. Dora Medina, an advisor to current Bolivian President Paz
Zamora, explains that less then 15 percent of this amount remains in the country. See S.
DORIA MEDINA, LA EcONOMIA INFORMAL EN BOLIVIA, at 70 (ed. Bolivians Limitada 1986).
Knowledgeable sources claim that cocaine production increased almost 100 percent be-
tween 1985 and 1990. Campodonicd' asserts that, although Bolivia produces 40 percent to
45 percent of the cocaine in the world and Peru produces 50 percent, only small amounts
of this cocaine reaches the United States: 5 percent to 10 percent of the Peruvian cocaine
and 15 percent of the Bolivian cocaine is exported to the United States. Large portions
of this cocaine is exported to Europe through Spain. Comision Andina report, supra note
4 at 223.
6 The policy of fighting the "war on drugs" at its source reached its current size
during the Reagan Administration, during. the period following the Presidents's declara-
tion of war on drugs and narco-traffic. See B. Bagely, U.S. Foreign Policy and the War
on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure, 30 J. INTERAM. STUD. AND WORLD AFF. 189, (1988).
The approach to quelling trafficking organizations in the drug producing countries is a
reaction to the inability of consuming countries to intercept drugs smuggled into their
markets in the 1970's and early 80's. See S. WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS:
OVERCOMING A FAILED POLICY, (1990) (hereinafter WISOTSKY]. This strategy consisted of
(a) on-site enforcement by South American police forces aided by the DEA, and (b)
crops substitution and eradication programs that, in Bolivia, are administrated by the
NAU. Although the U.S. was, and still is, the prominent head of the campaign, many
3
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weight of this friction is borne by the peasants in the coca grow-
ing areas. These peasants live in an area with no alternative
means of generating income than to grow coca and stomp the
leaf into coca paste.' The Bolivian enforcement agencies have
targeted this peasant population as their primary (and easiest)
target for eradicating the cocaine problem; a group that has al-
ready endured violence, harassment and pillage. This situation is
not only condoned by the DEA but is encouraged by them. For
an overgrown bureaucracy like the DEA, chasing coca growers is
also the easiest way to make convincing statistics in the further-
ance of sectoral and personal advantages. S
A. A Peculiar Kind of War
According to the Commander in Chief of the Bolivian
Armed Forces, Jorge Moreira, the United States has conditioned
Bolovian receipt of military aid to the direct involvement of said
military institution in the struggle against narco-traffic.9
In late September 1990, while the United Nations ° was
European countries have been staunch followers of the U.S. approach. This international
support has been manifested at the United Nations meeting held in Vienna every Febru-
ary where even the Soviet Union was in full agreement with an all out drug enforcement
approach in South America.
' In a recent article, I explained the connection between the repression and the in-
crease in the amount of coca paste stomping among coca growers. See J. Malamud Goti,
Soldiers, Peasants, Politicians and the War on Drugs in Bolivia, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. AND
POL'Y 35 (1990).
8 In a recent report of the United States Unit for Anti-Narcotics Activities in the
Andean Region, it is noted that "[tihe result of the misplaced emphasis on microlevel
indicators of success may be inaccurate and/or misleading information provided to Con-
gress. 'Overly positive' International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs) are
one example .... " Thirty-eighth Report by the Committee on Government Operations
at 31, Nov. 30 1990. This propensity is revealed by ex-DEA undercover veteran, Micheal
Levine. In his book, Levine states: "[I], too, believed the DEA was corrupt, but in a
totally different way . . . I believed the "suits" (highly ranked DEA officials) were lying
to the American public to perpetuate the funding of the agency and its programs and, of
course, their jobs; not to mention parlaying their easy access to the media into more
lucrative careers in the private sector and politics; along with a host of other reasons that
had nothing to do with winning the drug war." M. LEVINE, DEEP COVER: THE INSIDE
STORY OF How DEA INFIGHTING AND SUBTERFUGE LOST US THE BIGGEST BATTLE OF THE
DRUG WAR, at 159 (1990).
PRESENCIA (La Paz), Mar. 16, 1990.
" Due to the encouragment of its Director, Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Vienna based
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), has actively participated in
projects to develop the Chapare and the Yungas. Started in 1984, the UNFDAC program
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/5
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building new roads in the Chapare, the United States Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA) staged a major campaign in the
Chapare's Red Area11 to disable dirt roads presumed to be serv-
ing drug traffickers as cocaine paste pick-up airstrips. After the
completion of the campaign, the author was driven to the site by
a UMOPAR 12 agent so that he could view the deep craters pro-
duced by the DEA explosives dropped during the campaign. The
blasts had damaged straight segments of the roads that link the
villages of Isinuta, San Gabriel and Eterazama, which comprise
the most active sector in the cocaine paste trade in Bolivia in
1990. The UMOPAR agent pointed out that destroying the
roads did not facilitate drug enforcement.
First, the bombings increased the existing tension between
local residents and the police forces by damaging peasant prop-
erty. Although the United States Department of State Narcotics
Assistance Unit (NAU)13 contributed to the repair of any dam-
aged property, the peasants in the area were not appeased.
As a result of those bombings, in the last days of Septem-
ber, men and women campesinos14 surrounded a group of
UMOPAR and DEA personnel on the stony southern bank of
the Isiboro river, near the hamlet of Isinuta, and an hour long
shoot-out ensued. A helicopter came to the rescue of the encir-
cled officers and fired at the crowd, killing four campesinos.
Claiming that they had been attacked by cocaine traffickers, the
DEA agents left the Chapare on a few days rest with only one
man shot in the shoulder. While visiting the spot three days
goes on today, building and/or improving the state of the roads in these areas. Carlos
Montafio, ex-head of the project "Desarrollo del Chapare" (Development in the Chapare)
declares that new roads have been built from the Chapare villages of Alto Mariscal to
Bajo Mariscal and Villa 14 de Septiembre. Interview with Carlos Montafho held in La
Paz, May 21, 1990.
" "Red Areas" are zones where cocaine paste transactions take place regularly. Usu-
ally, cocaine traffic brings arms and violence into these sectors.
12 The "Bolivian Mobile Units for Mobile Areas," otherwise known as the
UMOPAR, are an elite police force trained by the United States to fight drug traffic in
the South American jungle. They are nicknamed the "Leopards."
" The NAU or the Narcotic Assistance Unit, is a United States agency which oper-
ates in drug exporting countries. They act like an administrative agency and funnel
money to the groups responsible for the actual drug confiscation/eradication, for exam-
ple, the DEA. Within the United States, the group is called the International Narcotic
Matters group or INM.
" The English translation of campesinos is "peasants."
19911
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later, the author observed the burnt remains of a UMOPAR
truck which the enforcers had left behind, lying on the bed of
the river.
Second, the bombings had extremely negative consequences
on future police activity in that sector. According to a UMOPAR
captain interviewed at the scene,15 the damaged roads would
have little effect on traffickers' pick up but would severely hin-
der land raids in Isinuta and San Gabriel. To carry on with their
habitual business, cocaine dealers needed only to offer the local
villagers two or three hundred dollars to clean the bush, thus
enabling the traffickers' small, light aircraft to land. At most, the
task would take three to four days. Ironically, a few miles away
from San Gabriel, on our return to Chimor6, we saw a bronze
plaque which was fixed to the side of a bridge stating that the
bridge had been "built with the effort of the people of the
United States: Peace Corps, 1968."
This episode illustrates the way in which the "war on
drugs" is being waged in Bolivia. It should not come as a sur-
prise that a sense of inevitable failure haunts the United States
Embassy's anti-drug specialized personnel in La Paz. Neverthe-
less, according to the logic of the "war on drugs," the correct
move is to step up available resources to fight the war. Accord-
ing to this logic, calling in the Bolivian army is essential.
This article explores the intricacies of the militarization of
the Bolivian anti-cocaine campaign and the politics that under-
lie contrasting positions about it. It argues that the United
States policy that urges military involvement in the "war on
drugs" attempts largely to conform to American war rhetoric.
The effort to engage the army ignores Bolivian history and the
sectoral feud between the military and the police. It also ignores
the problems inherent in Latin America's attempts to form dem-
ocratic governments and the effect of this deomcratization on its
relations with the United States. Furthermore, in Bolivia, re-
pression of cocaine related activities has a direct impact on the
activities of those who live in the Red Areas and can result in
the systematic violations of peasants' basic liberties. Thus the
militarization of the "war on drugs" will have a direct effect on
15 Interview with an unidentified UMOPAR captain in San Gabriel, Chapare, Bo-
livia (Oct. 2, 1990).
[Vol. 3:123
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human rights.
B. Who Wants to Deal With the Military?
The Commander in Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces,
Jorge Moreira Rojas, suggests that the involvement of the Boliv-
ian military should be as a last resort:
Due to the risks of corruption inherent in repressive actions
against narco-traffic, the army will only participate in such ac-
tions in case of extreme necessity, but will support in any event
activities designed by the government related to prevention and
alternative development."'
Coca growing and cocaine trafficking have relentlessly in-
creased in Bolivia during the 1980s, in spite of enforcement ef-
forts to thwart them. Many believe, as the United States policy
maintains, that the "war on drugs" is being lost for lack of re-
sources. This view holds that bringing the army into the "war on
drugs" is appropriate. Although the United States Government
maintains this position, Latin Americans have persistently de-
murred from it. At the Cartagena summit of February 1990,17
the Bolivian administration did agree to engage its army in drug
enforcement. However, this move does not reflect the Bolivian
political attitude regarding the matter. Bolivian critics of milita-
rizing the "war on drugs" had substantially supported the rea-
sons for their disagreement with the United States policy. A look
at the progress made in Bolivia over the last ten years, pursuant
to this United States-based policy, provides evidence that these
Bolivian critics were right for more reasons than those they had
espoused. Moreover, the Bolivians were not alone among Latin
Americans in thier criticism of United States policy.
"1 Interview with General Jorge Moreira Rojas, the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, ULTIMA HORA, La Paz, Jan. 16, 1990.
" In February 1990, the President of the United States, George Bush met with the
leaders of three South American countries in Cartegena, Columbia. Those leaders were
Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora, Peruvian President Alan Garcia and Colombian
President Virgilio Barco. At that time, Bush pledged to help these Andean nations fight
the drug war with aid for development. Zeballos, supra note 3.
1991]
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1. Latin American Resistance to Militarizing the "War on
Drugs"
At the November 13, 1987 meeting of the American Armies
held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, Latin American representa-
tives maintained a consensus about the overriding draw-backs of
engaging each country's armed forces in drug enforcement. The
Bolivian delegates agreed that despite the unsubstantiated as-
sertion that drug trafficking is strongly connected to radical ter-
rorists,18 the military should not be directly involved in drug en-
forcement. Only the Chileans, representing General Pinochet's 9
last holdout of military regimes in the Southern Cone,2" sup-
ported the United States proposal that the region's armies
should be deployed to persecute drug traffickers.
Several reasons to keep the military out of the "war on
drugs" were given. Corruption was likely to undermine soldier
morale and disrupt discipline. United States national security
doctrine, in its 1970s variant, had driven Latin American armies
to wage dirty wars against radical insurgency, and such confu-
sion of police and army roles had already proven costly. "Anti-
subversion" campaigns had resulted in massive violations of
human rights, politicization of military officers' cadres, and the
consequential extreme unpopularity of the armies of the South-
ern Cone.
Indeed, at the meeting in Mar del Plata, a large majority of
the Latin American militaries who were present believed in the
"stair-case theory" which claims that all evils requiring repres-
sion should be dealt with at the lowest possible governmental
level.2" In considering themselves their countries' last and lofti-
est resource, the military felt there would be no purpose in en-
" See Los Ejercitos Frente a la Droga (an unsigned editorial note), NUEVA SOCIEDAD
CARACAS, July-August 1989, at 136. See also WISOTSKY, supra note 6, at 162.
"9 General Augusto Pinochet, who took control of the Chilean government in 1973 in
a successful coup, remained in control as president for 17 years. In December of 1989, a
democratic election was held in Chile and Pinochet was replaced by a civilian president,
Patricio Ailwyna.
"0 I take the license of overlooking the case of Paraguay, a country where elections
almost universally are considered rigged. Information about the meeting was supplied to
the author by Adalberto Rodriguez Giavarini, the Argentinian Secretary of Defense
under President Alfonsin. Interviews with A. Rodriguez Giavarini held in Buenos Aires
(Jul. 9, Sept. 22 and Sept. 29, 1989).
21 Id.
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gaging their personnel in a struggle that the police forces should
be able to handle. Most of the high ranking military officers be-
lieved the most attractive policy consisted of discreetly removing
the armed forces from most of the conflicts related to non-insur-
gent criminality.22
When United States "war on drugs" advocates persisted,
the weak Latin American transitional civilian administrations
demanded a serious assessment of the danger that such a war
might incite institutional collapse. They worried that involving
armies in policing drug traffickers, whether or not such efforts
were ultimately successful, would inescapably have an undesir-
able consequence. First, if the armed forces failed, the inability
of defense systems to confront issues of national security would
be exposed to potential enemies.23 This argument is familiar to
U.S. authorities and scholars who adhere to the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act.24 This act prohibits the military from engaging
in internal enforcement and presumes that democracy is safe-
guarded by the distinction between enforcement and defense.25
Second, if the armed forces succeeded, although a highly im-
probable outcome, they could then argue that politicians are in-
capable of achieving what only the armed forces could accom-
plish. As drugs had been formally been labeled an issue of
national security since the mid 1980s,2 the military success
would point out the inefficiency of civilian government in the
management of the countries' most delicate internal affairs.
Some Latin American administrations, such as that of Mexico's
Salinas Gortari 2 7 made this point explicit.2 8
22 Id.
13 See D. Mabry, The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America, 30 J.
INTERAM. STUD. AND WORLD AFF. 53, (1988).
24 "Posse Comitatus" is defined as the power or force of the country. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990).
2" See, e.g., D. Mabry, supra note 23, at 53. The issue was discussed during a meet-
ing at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on Apr. 18, 1990. The Commit-
tees of Lectures and Continuing Education and Military Affairs and Justice held a panel
discussion on "Using the Military to Fight Drugs: All Right or All Wrong?," Apr. 18,
1990. The author was a member of the panel.
26 Annex 3 of the Cartagena Accord was signed by U.S. President Bush and Bolivian
President Paz Zamora in May 1990 to complement the multilateral agreement between
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and the U.S. In this Accord, it is expressly stated that drug
traffic poses a threat to the internal security of Bolivia.
2 Carlos Salinas Gortari was elected the president of Mexico in 1988. This cam-
1991]
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Other grounds for Latin American resistance to military in-
tervention stem from three dangerous dynamics of Latin Ameri-
can military history: (1) the lingering propensity of a number of
highly-ranked officers to get along with cocaine businessmen; (2)
a demonstrated readiness to abuse the rights of peasants; and
(3) the long standing nationalism that makes direct cooperation
with the United States impracticable. Moreover, the 1982 Falk-
lands/Malvinas experience had recently made Latin American
militaries overly cautious about the sturdiness of alliances estab-
lished with their North American comrades.
2. Bolivian Resistance to Militatrizing the "War on Drugs"
The commanders of the Bolivian armed forces had addi-
tional reasons for avoiding an engagement in drug enforcement
in their own country. Pictures of soldiers stomping coca leaves
and of army trucks carrying heaps of basic paste during General
Garcia Meza's2 9 cocaine dictatorship are still circulating among
politicians, trade union leaders and students. Such testimonies
hamper the army's legitimacy in the contemporary move to es-
tablish democracy. 30 Cocaine traffic emerged in Bolivia, not only
from opportunistic entrepreneurs in the private sector, but
under the aegis of military dictatorships which exacerbated the
military's current reputation and its role in a democratic state.
paign marked the first serious contest for the presidency in modern Mexican history.
Salinas Gortari, who represented the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), won the
election by a narrow margin.
"' Rohter, Mexican Leader Vows Action Against Drugs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1988
at A5, col. 1.
29 In 1980, General Luis Garcia Meza took control of the Bolivian government in a
successful military coup which prevented duly elected president, Siles Zuazo from taking
office. In August 1981, a uprising by soldiers in the eastern part of the country compelled
the military chiefs in the capital, La Paz, to eject the unpopular Garcia Meza from office,
leaving the government in control of a military junta headed by General Waldo Bernal.
"Bolivia to Charge Ex-President with Murder", Reuters Northern European News Ser-
vice, Reuters Ltd., Feb. 17, 1984 (La Paz). See also Bolivia: A Tale of Two Cities, ECON-
OMIST, Aug. 15, 1981, at 38.
" Hugo Cochamanidis is the Director of the Bolivian Direccion Nacional de la Coca
since January of 1990. In an interview held with the author on May 24 1990,
Cochamanidis recalled the army's poor record concerning the coca/cocaine issue. During
the times of Garcia Meza, photos were taken of army trucks transporting coca and of
soldiers stomping the coca leaves into basic paste. Interview with Hugo Cochamanidis
(May 24, 1990).
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The combination of governmental violence and the involve-
ment of top political officials in the drug trade may be traced to
General Hugo Banzer's a' dictatorship from 1971 to 1978. Al-
though Bolivia has borne over a hundred military coups, it was
during this period, under Banzer, in which the Bolivian cocaine
business took off. General Banzer, now the head of the A.D.M,
the third most powerful Bolivian political party, is now under
attack from Santa Cruz beer magnate Max Fernandez, "whom
the MIR party has groomed to succeed President Paz Zamora.
Fernandez has demanded that so-called dubious fortunes in Bo-
livia be investigated and insinuated that Banzer's wealth stems
from cocaine trafficking. This accusation, combined with previ-
ously held suspicions, makes the declarations by Banzer's politi-
cal defenders that his reputation should be cleansed, sound
purely rhetorical.32 Banzer's party qualified these accusations
against him as "groundless and cowardly." 3 It is evident that if
the general had not been personally involved in cocaine busi-
ness, he had at least acquiesced in his relatives and friends de-
voting themselves to exporting cocaine.
The origin of the Bolivian cocaine trade may be traced to
the collapse of the Banzer-promoted cotton industry in Santa
Cruz in the 1970s. Inexperienced growers took easy loans for the
cotton industry and were impelled to export the produce to re-
pay the banks at a time when the international prices were de-
pressed. Large parts of the cotton production wound up unsold
" General Hugo Banzer ruled Bolivia with an iron fist from 1971 to 1978. While in
power, he was alegedly responsible for torturing dozens of members of the current ruling
party, the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR) as well as the jailing and subse-
quent exiling of Jaime Paz Zamora, the current president of Bolivia. In an unexpected
turn of events, the former military dictator supported the moderate leftist Paz Zamora
for the presidency in the last election because of their mutual dislike for the front run-
ning candidate. Based on this alliance, a three month deadlock between Bolivia's three
main political parties was broken and Mr. Paz Zamora was elected president of Bolivia.
Meanwhile, Banzer was given the presidency of a two party commission which wields
much "behind the scenes" power in the government. Boadle, "Ex-Dictator Backs Leftist
for Bolivian Presidency," The Reuter Library Report, Aug. 3, 1989 (La Paz). See also
Bolivia: Giving It Away, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1990, at 48.
"2 "For the sake of the general, his party and the nation", the general's reputation
should be "cleansed." Statement by Bolivian Congressman Guido Camacho, as reported
in ULTIMA HORA, La Paz, (Feb. 17 1990).
" ULTIMA HORA (La Paz), Feb. 16 1990.
1991]
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in an attempt to retract untimely sales."' The subsequent loss of
international markets coupled with business mismanagement
drove the industry into bankruptcy. Santa Cruz cotton produc-
ers were forced to look for a more lucrative enterprise.3 5 The en-
terprise of choice was cocaine hydrochloride, and it required the
immediate development and organization of coca cultivation in
the Chapare.
Observers claim that there is no way that the government,
including General Banzer, could have ignored the events which
led up to the development of the cocaine trade. Santa Cruz
Banco de Cr6dito Agricola had a key role in setting up and fi-
nancing this novel industry. Banzer himself threw thousands of
peasants colonizing the area off their land to make more room
for agribusiness. He also deployed the military to quash strikes
in the mines.36 In addition, Banzer's son-in-law, Luis Valle, was
expelled from Canada after being found in possession of co-
caine17 and Banzer's nephew and private secretary were arrested
in Miami and Canada, respectively, on drug charges.3 8
The Banzer regime's cruelty, and its close connection with
the cocaine trade, pales in comparison with General Garcia
Meza's dictatorship in 1981-82. During his one year rule, Garcia
Meza and his Minister of the Interior, Colonel Arce Gomez 9
used the armed forces to assassinate protesting workers, to tor-
ture dissidents and to abduct persons suspected of conspiracy
against the regime. Garcia Meza operated with the expertise of
34 Some observers attribute the fiasco to the attempt to make up for the forgone
profits by selling cotton of a shorter strand which was rejected by European purchasers.
This version is espoused by Enrique Valverde, who was chief of the NAU in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia until 1990. See also ECKSTEIN, TRANSFORMATION OF A "REVOLUTION FROM
BELOW" BOLIVIA AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 105 (Society for Comparative Study of So-
ciety and History)(1983).
35 Id.
11 See J. NASH, WE EAT THE MINES AND THE MINES EAT US (1978); DUNKERLEY, RE-
BELLION IN THE VEINS: POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN BOLIVIA 1952-1982 (1984) (hereinafter
DUNKERLEY).
11 DUNKERLEY, supra note 36, at 318.
38 Id.
3 Colonel Luis Arce Gomez was extradited to the United States in December, 1989
on a 1983 drug conspiracy indictment which charged that he had accepted bribes every
two weeks to ignore cocaine traffickers who moved in and out of Bolivia. On March 22,
1991, he was sentenced to a maximum punishment of 30 years imprisonment. 30 Year
Drug Sentence for Ex-Bolivian Aide, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1991, at 9, col.1.
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Argentine officers trained at the Escuela de Mecanica de la Ar-
mada("ESMA")"° in Buenos Aires. Garcia Meza's nazi bent was
revealed by the creation of the "Novios de la Muerte,"4 ' which
seems still to be active in 1990.42 A prominent character linked
to Garcia Meza and cocaine magnate Roberto Suarez Gomez was
Klaus Altmann Barbie, whose extradition France had requested
for the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis in the city of Lyon
where Barbie was the head of the Gestapo. 43
In mid 1989, General Arrdzola's arrest was a reminder of the
early days of Garcia Meza's regime. Arr6zola, commander of the
7th Army Division, was apprehended in the city of Cochabamba
where the unit is stationed and was charged with being involved
with drug traffickers. In October 1990, he was still under arrest
in Cochabamba.
The 7th Army Division's connection with cocaine traffickers
was not limited to Arrdzola. Three highly ranked officers under
the general's command managed to flee at the time of the arrest
and were still at large in October of 1990. Although no final deci-
sion as to Arrizola's responsibility had been made at that time,
there was consensus among civilian and military observers that
General Arrazola, who acted as Garcia Meza's representative
before the trade unions,44 was up to his ears in cocaine money.
UMOPAR officers assert that what determined the general's ar-
rest was the direct intervention of United States military at-
tach6 Colonel Hayes to have Arrdzola investigated. 45
40 For a detailed description of what has occurred at the Escuela de Mecanica de la
Armada in Buenos Aires since 1976, see Nunca Mas, Informe de la Comision Nacional
Sobre la Desaparicion de Personas at 80 (ed. Universitaria Buenos Aires, 1986). See also
I. GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES (1990), at ch. 1.
" Translated into English, this phrase means the "Grooms of Death." This
paramilitary group from Santa Cruz boast swastikas and worship symbols of Hitler's
Germany.
"' Interview with Enrique Valverde, head of the Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) in
Cochabamba (May 26, 1990).
" Valverde had the opportunity in his youth to listen to Barbie as the old German
recalled the Nazi era with nostalgia. Interview with Valverde, supra note 41.
" In 1981, in an attempt to appease the bellicose miners unions, Colonel Arrazola
promised to release certain political prisoners and to guarantee workers a minimum
amount of stability in their jobs. The government considered this agreement to be too
benevolent and did not honor it. DUNKERLEY, supra note 36, at 296.
" Interview with an unidentified UMOPAR captain in Villa Tunari, Chapare (May,
1990).
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In the contemporary move toward a substantive democracy
that implies respect for human rights and intolerance of human
rights abuses, Bolivian military officers were aware of the insti-
tutional risks presupposed by engaging in drug enforcement.
General Moreira Rojas, commander of the armed forces, can-
didly alerted the administration and the citizenry in general
that, by persecuting cocaine dealers, the army would lose control
over officers who surrendered to the temptation of cocaine
money.""
Despite Bolivia's recent history of dictators and cocaine
traffic, the United States was also not discouraged from urging
Bolivia to engage its military in drug enforcement. Detailed in-
formation was received from the DEA and the NAU in La Paz
that General Arrdzola's entanglement with drug traffickers was
not an isolated case among officers of the army.47 Despite rea-
sons which outweighed the advantages of involving the army in
the "war on drugs," President Bush pressed Bolivia, as well as
Peru and Colombia to make a formal commitment in this direc-
tion.48 The purpose of militarizing enforcement is expressly
mentioned in Annex 3 of the Cartagena agreement, in which
over thirty-three million dollars was allotted to drug enforce-
ment in Bolivia, largely for army training and equipment. In
May 1990, Presidents Bush and. Paz Zamora exchanged formal
notes ratifying their intent to accelerate the "war on drugs" in
Bolivia by engaging the Bolivian army.
At home, Paz Zamora's pledge to the United States found
staunch opposition from the coca growers and large political sec-
tors. Peasant unions took a strong stand against President Paz
" The commander in chief of the armed forces, General Jorge Moreira Rojas de-
clared that, by engaging in drug enforcement, the army was running the risk of becoming
corrupt ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Jan. 16, 1990). A few months later, the head of the army,
General Rolando Espinoza conveyed the same fear: "If the President of the Republic,
after the summit, decides to have us participate, we will do it for the sake of national
security, despite the risks that this involves .... " ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Feb. 3, 1990).
7 The NAU had made a full report to its headquarters in La Paz. Statement of an
unidentified NAU official who participated in drafting the report in an interview (Octo-
ber 4, 1990).
" The U.S. administration's resolution to have these countries' involve their armies
in drug enforcement is specified in the The White House Report on the National Drug
Control Strategy, Jan. 1990. This report states the purpose "to increase the effectiveness
of law enforcement and military activities in the three countries against cocaine trade" is
listed among the main goals. Id. at 50.
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Zamora's commitment. Coca growers vowed through their
leader, Evo Morales, to defend plantations with their lives."9
The Bolivian Senate adopted a formal resolution strongly disap-
proving of the army's involvement in drug policing. 50 In early
April, non-governmental organizations in Bolivia expressed their
support of the "cocaleros" promising to stage a major campaign
against United States-backed militarization of drug enforce-
ment.51 They argued that engaging the army would unleash
human rights abuses. It was thought, in all liklihood, the army
would increase the amount of violence borne by coca growers
who have already endured constant abuses from the UMOPAR.
Sectors of the Catholic Church joined in denouncing the pro-
posed army intervention.2 The "cocaleros" also mustered inter-
national support.
In March 1990, forty-five legislators from fourteen Latin
American countries held the fifth meeting of the Parlamento La-
tinoamericano.53 On that occasion, the Parlamento issued a
statement repudiating the militarization of the coca/cocaine
trade war enforcement. They stated that such a step would be a
source of social instability.s4 Confining the Bolivian armed forces
to their circumscribed role within a newly democratic system re-
quired too much effort for it to be imperiled by U.S.
exigencies.5 5
Although the last twenty years of Bolivian history provided
abundant data to support the efforts of Parlamento Latinoamer-
icano, the NGO's and peasant unions to keep the army out of
the Chapare, was not just history alone that spelled disaster. It
was the conflicts between the army and the UMOPAR police in
a struggling democracy that made the difference. In response to
ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Apr. 14, 1990). See also PRESENCIA, La Paz (May 9, 1990).
0 ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Jan. 16, 1990).
PRESENCIA, La Paz (Apr. 8, 1990). "Cocaleros" is the Spanish term used in Bolivia
to describe persons involved in the cultivation of cocaine.
5 The Church has historically been concerned about the rights of the peasants be-
ing trampled upon by the army. See DUNKERLEY, supra note 36, at 215.
" The Parlamento Latinoamericano is an organization comprised of non-conserva-
tive members of the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay)
as well as Costa Rica. They are not formalized and do not officially exist.
14 See PRESENCIA, La Paz (Mar. 21, 1990). See also ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Mar. 21,
1990).
"8 See Militarizacion versus Democracia, PRESENCIA, La Paz (Mar. 17, 1990).
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widespread concern, General Victor Vargas, commander of the
airborne unit operating in the Chapare, hustled to calm the
campesinos. Vargas assured them that the army posed no threat
to coca growers and promised that the forces under his com-
mand were there to avert abuses from other agencies, 56 obviously
alluding to the UMOPAR.
Paz Zamora's administration was also confronted with a le-
galistic turn that further complicated the army's intervention.
Section 1008 of the 1988 anti-drug law57 created a special coun-
sel of cabinet ministers with the authority to dictate drug con-
trol policies." Until May 1990, these policies related to activities
of the Bolivian anti-drug "Special Forces" that consisted of the
narcotics (urban) police, the UMOPAR police, air force pilots
and naval officers. These "Special Forces" had been operating
under the unified command of a retired army general. Although
Law §1008 envisions the armed forces cooperation with person-
nel and equipment at the counsel's request,59 its'procedural pro-
visions confer authority to conduct legal proceedings solely upon
the country's "Special Forces."" ° Thus, the law has been con-
strued as limiting the authority of the executive branch to con-
trol the army's intervention in drug enforcement.61 The army
may be called to participate if drug traffick exceeds the police
" Opinion, Cochabamba, Apr. 15, 1990.
" The Law of the Cocaine and Controlled Substances Regime was enacted on July
19, 1988. The law differentiates between coca leaves in their natural state, the possession
and cultivation of which is legal; and coca leaves which have been chemically processed
to extract cocaine, the possession of which is illegal.
The law sets limits for the harvesting of coca leaves in certain regions and estab-
lishes programs in support of alternative crops.
"8 The Consejo Nacional Contra el Uso Indebido y el Trifico Ilicito de Drogas (Na-
tional Counsel Against Undue Use and Illegal Drug Traffic) created by Law §1008 of
July 1988, is integrated with the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice and the Interior,
Coordination and Planning, Public Health, Defense, Finances and Aeronautics (article
133). They have supreme authority over the "Special Forces" and are entitled to appeal
to the armed forces for personnel and equipment, under article 135 of the law, which
calls for institutional cooperation between the "nation's armed forces and the police, at
the request of the National Council." Article 135, Law §1008.
Law § 1008, art. 135.
60 Article 85 (a) of the Law §1008 prescribes that the "Special Forces" will initiate
the proceedings in drug related cases. Article 86 abbreviates the procedure in drug re-
lated cases and foresees the auxiliary role of the police. Similarly, article 92 (a) stipulates
that special prosecutors have authority over the police forces.
"' This intervention is foreseen in art. 135, Law § 1008.
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forces' resources.2 Nonetheless, when it was suggested in April
1990 that the police were being overpowered by an increase in
cocaine traffic, an array of conflicting opinions arose from sectors
within the Bolivian government.
The issue of whether to call in the army to cooperate with
the UMOPAR could not surmount the objection that, according
to the administration's assertion, the country's 1990's anti-drug
achievements had substantially surpassed those in previous
years. Before meeting with President Bush in May 1990, Presi-
dent Paz Zamora stated that calling the military into the "war
on drugs" was unjustified, because the police were faring well
enough and the addition of the armed forces would cause "un-
necessary violence. '6 3
In May 1990, Paz Zamora's minister of the Interior, Guil-
lermo Capobianco, stated that despite the UMOPAR's lack of
equipment, neither Peru nor Colombia could match Bolivia's
success at drug enforcement." In September, 1990, President
Paz Zamora went further and proudly declared that his country
was controlling the drug business better than any other nation
in the region.5 Once more, Capobianco used the occasion to
come to the forefront and state flatly that the possibility that
the traffickers would defeat the UMOPAR was remote, thus im-
plying that there was no room for the army in anti-drug
enforcement.6
Capobianco's Under Secretary, Loaysa Montoya, who had
direct authority over the Bolivian police forces, also assessed the
situation. Loaysa Montoya attributed expectations about the
army intervention in the "war on drugs" to a stratagem of the
62 Such interpretation is cogent with the Cartagena Accord signed by the presidents
of the United States, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in February 15 1990. In this Accord, it
is stated that repression of drug trafficking is essentially a police matter (Annex 3, IA of
the Accord of May 1990).
'3 ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 8, 1990).
ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 9, 1990).
6 "I do not know where the ambassador may have gotten the information from.
Bolivia has proven to be the first country in fighting narco-traffic in Latin America and
has beaten all records of efficiency in that terrain." President Paz Zamora, in response to
public complaints from United States Ambassador Robert Gelbard, La Razon (La Paz),
(Sept. 27, 1990).
66 ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 23, 1990).
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political opposition. 7 According to Loaysa Montoya, enforce-
ment must be dealt with by the police, and the chance that the
UMOPAR might be overpowered by the traffickers was only re-
mote. However, Loaysa Montoya felt that, despite the Paz
Zamora administration's good record, it was prudent to train
army units for the improbable event of an increase in the drug
business.6 a
The prevailing opinion at the United States Embassy was at
variance with that of President Paz Zamora and his aides. Get-
ting the army involved was a condition of the pledge Bolivia
made to the United States. As a signatory to the Cartagena
agreement and Annex 3 subsequently negotiated by Presidents
Paz Zamora and Bush, Bolivia is formally bound to engage its
armed forces in anti-drug efforts.69 In addition to the formal
promise, there were practical considerations. Although Bolivia is
not enduring the nightmare of violent insurgency that plagues
Colombia and Peru, cocaine traffickers exercise control over the
remote region of Pando and over a number of villages in the
northern region of the Beni.70 United States and Bolivian au-
thorities are also concerned with reports that Shining Path'
guerrillas are setting up encampments in north western Pando, a
region that borders with the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazon.
Drug traffickers literally control the town of Santa Ana de
Yacuma 2 and San Ramon. A United States Embassy official
" Interview with Under Secretary Loaysa Montoya at the Ministry of the Interior
(May 25, 1990).
68 Id.
69 Clause II-B of Annex 3 of the Cartagena Accord; see ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Apr.
29, 1990). In September 1990, as a consequence of the Cartagena Accord, only Bolivia is
still committed to the U.S. to engage its army in anti-drug operations as a last resource.
Recently inaugurated Presidents Fujimori in Peru and Gaviria in Colombia have
staunchly opposed such involvement. In the opinion of President Gaviria, "demilitariz-
ing" drug enforcement despite military claims of considerable success, is a necessary
means to reduce out-of-control violence. Buenos Aires Herald, Sept. 16, 1990.
70 United States Ambassador Robert Gelbard conveyed his concern about this pres-
ence to the author in an interview held at the United States Embassy in La Paz, in
September, 1989. Today, NAU officials confess that United States forces, the DEA in
particular, would not dare deal with cocaine operations known to take place in that area,
as revealed by a NAU agent during an interview with the author in La Paz (Oct. 1990).
"1 "Shining Path" is an ultraleftist guerrilla organization known for its terrorist ac-
tivity. They are believed to operate out of Peru.
7" La Paz newspapers narrate how traffickers wanted by the authorities for drug
related offenses are able to walk around in broad daylight with no interference from the
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maintains that in 1989, two helicopters transporting UMOPAR/
DEA personnel to Santa Ana were assaulted in an incident dur-
ing which the personnel involved could not respond effectively.73
Had those personnel fired back, they would have injured inno-
cent peasants. 4 This version is at odds with descriptions given
by onlookers who recall a violent fray in which several peasants
were killed.7" The United States Embassy official's version was
presumably styled to justify the pressure to involve the Bolivian
army. According to the United States Embassy, Annex 3 of the
Cartagena agreement prescribes that two light infantry regi-
ments and an engineer battalion operate in the Chapare and
Beni regions to watch over the northern Peruvian border.76
II. A POLITICAL DILEMMA
The issue of army intervention left Bolivian officials in a
quandary. While politicians found it crucial to underline the Paz
Zamora administration's success in curbing the coca/cocaine
business, the antithesis was also essential: calling in the army
would please the U.S., for it would exhibit the staunchness re-
police. See ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Feb. 17, 1990). See also, WISOTSKY supra note 5
at 157.
" It is likely that the helicopters were actually hit by stones. A UMOPAR officer
that participated in the event disclosed to the author that the UMOPAR/DEA force was
compelled to take off by hostile peasants that surrounded them hurling stones at the
helicopters. Interview in Villa Tunari (May 28, 1990).
"' Interview with a high ranking NAU agent that the author met at the U.S. Em-
bassy in La Paz on May 24 1990 . The U.S. Embassy officer's version of the story is at
variance with the data collected by the author. See infra note 78.
" Elva Morales, a special journalist from Cochabamba maintained that enforcement
agents had opened fire on residents of Santa Ana. This story was corroborated by Jorge
Torrico, adviser and relative to the Under Secretary of Social Defense, Gonzalo Torrico.
In an interview, Jorge Torrico went further and stated that enforcement agents had
opened fire on local politicians (interview with Jorge Torrico held at the Social Defense
Ministry on May 22, 1990). UMOPAR officers also admit that they had opened fire on
local residents and traffickers in a muddled episode (interview with Jorge Torrico in La
Paz, Chapare ( May 28, 1990)). There are also indicators that United States personnel
were directly involved: A United States air force officer, Equatorian born Hugo Duque,
was wounded and spent a few hours at the Hospital Clinica Belga in Cochabamba before
being taken away to La Paz or the United States. Interview with Elva Morales in Cocha-
bamba (Jan. 15, 1990). An interview with an unidentified NAU officer in Cochabamba
(May 28, 1990).
" Annex 3, Section II(D.l.a). Interview with an unidentified high ranking NAU offi-
cial at the U.S. Embassy (May 24, 1990).
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quired to reverse other Latin American countries' incredulity;
however, calling in the army would also imply that things were
not going well. Clearly, a policy of highlighting the government's
achievements on the one hand, and escalating the "war on
drugs" on the other hand, are not compatible.
As a number of officials have revealed, large trafficking orga-
nizations remain intact. Eradicated plots of coca have been re-
placed by others in more inaccessible areas. In fact, most experts
on the drug issue in Bolivia assert that the number of coca plots
increased considerably in 1990.7 A Bolivian counselor to the
DEA stated that the official figures of eliminated coca do not
reveal the real state of affairs: First, there is a considerable de-
gree of deception in the accounting of the areas eliminated; sec-
ond, new plantations in remote areas more than replace lost co-
cales. 78 Furthermore, crop substitution in these new plantations
is highly unlikely because the lack of roads in the region render
it difficult, if not impossible, to transport and market perishable
produce. Land amenable to growing coca in the Chapare and
Isiboro Secure regions alone exceed three million hectares, which
implies that, at the most, for every parcel sowed with coca there
are thirty potential others.
Deputy Under Secretary of Social Defense, Jorge Torrico,
stated that despite the Paz Zamora administration's "improve-
ment" of the coca/cocaine situation, the amount of drug traffick-
ing was surpassing the UMOPAR's capacities to control it.7 9
This view conveys that this special police unit had its own short-
comings in providing solutions for the expansion of coca paste-
making and for reaching the upper echelons of cocaine organiza-
tions.8 0 These shortcomings, however, are a consequence of the
UMOPAR's lack of adequate equipment and information. 1
"' The chief of the NAU (Narcotics Assistance Unit) of the United States Depart-
ment of State until 1990, stressed this fact on several occasions in May and September
1990. The same opinion was espoused by Armando Aquino Huerta, a lawyer who was
adviser to the DEA in Bolivia. Interview at Huerta's office in La Paz (May 24 1990).
78 Id.
71 Interview with Jorge Torrico, La Paz, Chapare (May 28, 1990).
O Interviews with NAU agent Gustavo in Cochabamba, and UMOPAR Captain
Ayala, Chimori, Chapare (May 29, 1990).
" The UMOPAR equipment shortage is largely a consequence of the army's vetoing
each attempt made by the United States Embassy to supply modern arms and communi-
cation gear to the UMOPAR. It seems that the army feared the UMOPAR could match
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Besides equipment deficiencies there were other develop-
ments in 1990 that diminished the capability of the UMOPAR
to fight drug trafficking. The NAU office in La Paz turned the
UMOPAR training course, "Garras del Valor,"82 into an interna-
tional event. The United States Embassy had dispatched joint
American-Bolivian invitations to European and Latin American
governments to have their police forces send officers to the
"Garras del Valor" course.8 3 The Americans and Bolivians
thought the 55 day training program held in Chimor6 would per-
mit the international community to witness the professional ca-
pabilities the UMOPAR acquired from their United States
trainers.8 4 Unfortunately, opening the course to foreign officers
had visible disadvantages: it shrunk the room available for
UMOPAR personnel to attend the course and squandered lim-
ited resources on foreign agents. Furthermore, the effort turned
out to be a futile extravagance. For most of the guest police
trainees, the jungle scenario was alien to their countries' law en-
forcement needs. Italians and Spaniards flatly turned down their
invitations to participate. German, Argentine and other police
forces who did attend were baffled by the exotic environment
where the course was taught. In Argentina and Ecuador, drug
enforcement takes place in urban areas rather than the bush.
European agents had never even seen such a setting or ever con-
sidered operating in it. It was no surprise that most of the guest
trainees either did not start the course or did not complete it.
8 5
In short, resources were wasted, at the expense of the
UMOPAR, for the sake of the NAU and DEA's image 8
their own capabilities. See Malamud Goti, supra note 7, at 135. Also M. Benitez Larroca,
UMOPAR Libra Una Batalla Desigual Contra el Narcotrdfico en Chapare, PRESENCIA,
La Paz (Mar. 18, 1990).
82 The English translation of Garras del Valor is "Clutches of Valor."
According to the La Paz journal, PRESENCIA, the invitations were issued by U.S.
Embassy high official, Brian Stickney as well as General Felipe Carvajal, commander of
the Bolivian police force. PRESENCIA, La Paz (Jan. 27, 1990).
84 The complaint that the UMOPAR was not equipped with sufficient ammunition,
uniforms, mattresses and so forth did not apply to the "Garras del Valor" course. Of-
ficers in this program do not endure any such shortages (Interviews with UMOPAR Cap-
tain Ayala, and Paraguayan NAU agent Gustavo in Chimor6, Chapare, on May 29, 1990).
8 Id. Interview with Enrique Valverde, Villa Tunari, Chapare (May 30, 1990).
88 UMOPAR and NAU officers in the Chapare believe that the idea came from top
NAU agents in La Paz. Interviews with unidentified officers conducted in the Chapare,
May 27 - 30, 1990.
1991]
21
PACE YB. INT'L L.
After the Cartagena summit in February 1990, the United
States Embassy stressed the American demand for the involve-
ment of the army and that the State Department would contrib-
ute 33 million dollars in war equipment, conditioned largely on
the army's engagement in the "war on drugs." The U.S. plea had
a strong impact on the generals in Bolivia and the Bolivian mili-
tary's view of its role in the "war on drugs" shifted dramatically.
Abandoning the abstentionist position they had held in 1987,
'8
those who participated in the discussions at the U.S. Embassy
carried with them a long list of items that had caught their eye.
United States expectations provided a unique opportunity to ob-
tain these items. Although many Bolivian observers believe that
the military were merely receiving post-Korean war scrap," the
Bolivian military who visited the U.S. Embassy were not dis-
enchanted. A U.S. diplomatic official recalled his perplexity
when the generals unrolled their inventory list: "We were sur-
prised that they did not demand submarines and aircraft-carri-
ers", he recalls.8 " Bolivia is a land-locked country.
Not all the officers in the Bolivian army agreed with the
government's resolution to engage the army in interdiction.
Some high-ranking officers were skeptical, largely for three rea-
sons. First, previous attempts to coordinate the army's action
with that of the police had posed insurmountable difficulties; 90
. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Interviews with Hugo Cochamanidis, head of the Direccion Nacional de la Coca,
La Paz (May 24, 1990); and Bolivian congressman Ernesto Machicado, La Paz (May 25,
1990).
89 Interview with an official from the U.S. Embassy who asked not to be identified
(May 23, 1990).
90 In "Operation Blast Furnace," staged in Bolivia in 1986, 160 U.S. military troops
and UMOPAR units were transported into the Beni, the Chapare, and Santa Cruz on six
United States Black Hawk helicopters. An airlift was set up between La Paz and Trini-
dad where the operation's headquarters was established. Louis Goodman and Johanna
S.R. Mendelson quote Colonel Michael Abbott, a participant in the operation, as stating
that future undertakings such as "Blast Furnace" were not highly probable because: (1)
the costs are not compensated by the potential gains; (2) real payoffs are not relevant
once the operation is over; and (3) no country is likely to ask the United States to carry
out such operations because the political cost of having U.S. troops at home is too high.
See Goodman, The Threat of New Missions: Latin American Militaries and the Drug
War, in THE FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, at 193 (1990). Ac-
cording to NAU official Enrique Valverde, one of the top United States army officers in
the "Blast Furnace" operation stated off the record that coordination between the army,
the UMOPAR and the DEA was impossible. This United States army officer added that
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second, corruption is an everlasting danger for many officers;
third, army officers' nationalism threatens to jeopardize the Bo-
livian's administration's endeavors to improve its relations with
U.S. diplomats and drug enforcement officers deployed in Bo-
livia. Since late 1989, Bolivian "Special Forces" had been under
the unified command of a retired, reputable army general named
Lucio Afiez. 1 In October 1990, General Afiez indicated that de-
spite his own military background, he did not believe that, once
into the "war on drugs", the "Special Forces" would be any safer
from the economic temptations of cocaine than the UMOPAR or
the army. He also has suggested that harmony between the mili-
tary and the UMOPAR at this stage was unlikely.92 In fact, the
possibility that the army and the UMOPAR would cooperate
seemed almost non-existent.
There appeared to be three equally non-viable alternatives:
First, each force might operate independently. This option was
untenable to all parties because it meant inter-force conflict and
inefficiency. Second, the joint command might be unified under
the control of army officers. The UMOPAR found this option
intolerable. President Paz Zamora had ordered the army to sup-
port the UMOPAR with intelligence and logistics, thereby rela-
gating the military to a secondary role;93 and the UMOPAR had
reasons to believe that since they were the ones who risked their
skins in the jungle, they should be granted a central role. Third,
unified leadership might be conferred on the UMOPAR. The
armed forces, however, found this option insufferable. The mili-
tary had traditionally viewed the police as pariahs, historically
relegated to less important matters than defending the country's
sovereignty. This view was clearly laid out by Marcelo Quiroga
Obregon, a member of the Lower Chamber Defense Commission.
he would vehemently oppose any attempt to stage another such operation because coor-
dination and cooperation between the participating forces was deplorable. Interview with
Enrique Valverde at Villa Tunari, Chapare, (May 26, 1990).
91 According to the "Dangerous Drugs" police superintendent in Buenos Aires
(Superintendencia de Drogas Peligrosas), General Afiez had a unanimous reputation for
his personal decency and democratic convictions. Interview on July 11, 1990.
92 Interview with General Lucio Aftez, May. 31, 1990.
9' Samuel Doria Medina, Bolivian presidential adviser, added that the army's role
should be confined to contributions toward building an infrastructure which would facili-
tate the implementation of an alternative development plan. PRESENCIA, La Paz (Mar.
16, 1990). This view is widely shared by scholars and politicians in Bolivia today.
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Quiroga Obregon rejected the possibility of subordinating the
army to the UMOPAR because the former "were born before the
Republic and represents the country's fundamental custodian
which cannot therefore be subordinated to any other institution
than the Constitution.""4
Military contempt for the police force has a long history.
This contempt turned to hatred in 1952, when the Paz Esten-
ssoro revolution toppled the junta of General Ballividn. To this
day, the generals are unable to forget that the police force not
only supported Paz Estenssoro against the army-led dictator-
ship, but that they also ventured to close down the military
academy. 8 The army viewed the events of 1952 as a challenge to
their esprit de corps. In 1990, the prospect of the army joining
the UMOPAR in drug enforcement re-opened these old wounds.
III. THE NEW "WAR": THE ARMY vs. THE POLICE
When the interim Commander in Chief of the Army, Gen-
eral Guido Sandoval, stated that the armed forces were ready to
"broaden" anti-drug operations, then limited to the police, it
was clear that trouble over institutional hegemony had emerged.
The chief of the UMOPAR, General Felipe Carvajal reacted
briskly by cutting the army down to size. Voicing the convictions
of the UMOPAR, Carvajal announced publicly that the army
would have to subordinate its job to the UMOPAR.98 The head
of the UMOPAR explained that the experience and technical
skills of the force demanded that the army make do with a sec-
ondary role in drug enforcement.9 Seemingly, there was no way
to minimally satisfy the aspirations of both the army and the
UMOPAR.
In early April 1990, President Paz Zamora ordered the Bar-
rientos and Ustariz infantry regiments to get ready to fight co-
caine traffic in the Chapare jungle. Shortly before the drill
started in May, the commanding officer of the Barrientos unit,
Colonel Rodriguez, conveyed to civilians in Cochabamba that
" ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Apr. 4, 1990). Seemingly, Quiroga Obregon overlooked the
president as the constitutional commander of the armed forces.
" For an account of these developments see DUNKERLEY, supra note 36 at chapter 1.
ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (Mar. 21, 1990).
" ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 31, 1990).
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once joint drug enforcement operations got started, the first task
the Bolivian army was ready to tackle would consist of cracking
down on the UMOPAR and the DEA. According to the Colonel,
the UMOPAR deserved to be dismantled due to what amounts
to a twofold contamination: a large sector of the UMOPAR had
been bought off by the traffickers, and the entire force had sold
its loyalty to the DEA Yankis, a bunch of corrupt interlopers. 8
From other similar declarations recorded at that time, foreign
intelligence in La Paz revealed that Colonel Rodriguez had not
spoken out of personal eccentricity. The colonel's opinion was
shared by many of his comrades. 9
The declared animosity against the UMOPAR and the DEA
proved serious. In addition to a series of minor hostile incidents
between the army and the UMOPAR, the army also demon-
strated a lack of sympathy for the DEA. Officers from the Bar-
rientos regiment stationed on the road leading from the town of
Cochabamba to the Chapare arrested three DEA agents on the
grounds that the men did not carry adequate personal creden-
tials. 100 The United States Embassy considered the act exasper-
ating, given the diplomatic status of the DEA personnel.
The entry of the Barrientos infantry regiment, on maneu-
vers into the Chapare, posed a "dissuasive, psychological obsta-
cle" 101 to traffickers, according to their commander, General
Victor Vargas. These manuvers became a landmark in the his-
tory of friction between the army and the police. On May 7, a
group of young army officers attacked four UMOPAR agents
near their barracks in Villa Tunari, after threats and provoca-
tions from a dozen officers of the Barrientos regiment. During
this incident, which occurred at a canteen near Villa Tunari,
three of the UMOPAR agents managed to escape. The fourth
o Opinion voiced to Enrique Valverde, ex-head of the NAU in Cochabamba, by a
high military source. The source was not identified. Interview with Enrique Valverde in
the Chapare village of Irvirgarzama, May 26, 1990.
" Interview with an Argentine intelligence agent who asked not to be identified
(May 21, 1990).
100 Interview with Enrique Valverde, former head of the NAU in Cochabamba (May
26, 1990).
101 The commander of the airborne brigade, General Victor Vargas declared that the
presence of the army posed a psychological deterrent to the traffickers. The army's sali-
ent role in protecting the "internal order" also safeguarded the peasantry from alleged
abuses from the UMOPAR. Opinion, Apr. 15, 1990.
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agent, a corporal named Mariani,1°2 was caught after unsuccess-
fully attempting to hide in his girl friend's room at the back of
the canteen. A brief description of circumstances surrounding
the beating of Corporal Mariani did not indicate personal feud,
but rather institutional incompatibility.
Mariani was severely battered and later driven away to the
Barrientos regiment's bivouac where he was beaten almost to
death. On May 11, UMOPAR Captain Ayala was called from the
Barrientos regiment to take the corporal back to his unit. Based
on the physical condition of the corporal, the captain demanded
that a written report with a description of Mariani's injuries be
signed by military officers. Ayala wanted to avoid the responsi-
bility in the event the corporal did not make it to a hospital
alive.103
After being flown from the Chapare to a hospital in the city
of Cochabamba, Mariani was confined in the intensive care unit
for five days. He was still convalescing from the incident at the
end of May. The military personnel who had beaten Mariani ex-
plained to the army colonel in charge of probing the episode that
the victim had been trying to take photos of them. This frail
attempt to justify the aggression was thwarted by eyewitnesses
who declared that the battered corporal was not carrying a cam-
era at the time of the incident. The investigation brought about
further grievances from UMOPAR personnel. Interrogated by
army officers conducting the probe, they complained of being in-
quisitorially dealt with during the investigation, maintaining
that they were treated by the colonel and his staff as suspects
instead of witnesses.10 4
In the aftermath of the Mariani incident, the commander in
chief of the army declared that the episode had not altered the
"normal activities of both forces. 10 5 UMOPAR officers did not
agree with this statement, as evidenced by the brisk response of
the head of the "Garras del Valor" course. In response to the top
army commander, UMOPAR Captain Ayala asserted that "fu-
102 Some versions referred to the corporal as "Mamani".
103 Interview with Captain Ayala of the UMOPAR in Chimor6 (May 29, 1990). En-
rique Valverde agreed with Ayala's version of the story. Interview with Enrique Valverde
(May 29, 1990).
304 An unidentified UMOPAR officer interviewed in Chimor6 (May 29, 1990).
300 PRESENCIA, La Paz (May 16, 1990).
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ture provocations" from the army would bring about "unwaver-
ing retaliation" from the UMOPAR.' e This response was not is-
sued by a formal spokesman for the UMOPAR and did not carry
the appropriate style required to handle the inter-force conflict;
but it did make clear that underneath the Mariani incident lies
a deeper confrontation. Corporate friction is likely to neutralize
any attempt at attaining an acceptable degree of cooperation be-
tween the UMOPAR and the armed forces. By mid-May, the
pessimistic forecast that cooperation between the army and the
police would not work proved to be correct. Two recent events
demonstrate this point.
In May 1990, the second officer in command of the
UMOPAR in the Chapare outpost of Chimor6 was Major
Ramiro Ortega. Through an internal memorandum Ortega re-
ported another perplexing incident to the commander of the Bo-
livian Special Forces, army General Lucio Afiez. According to
the memorandum, on the morning of May 10th, Army personnel
opened fire on the UMOPAR helicopters to deter them from fly-
ing over their encampment. The helicopters immediately flew
away in order to avoid a confrontation. 07
The head of the anti-drug forces, General Afiez, notified his
colleague, Army Commander-in-Chief General Moreira, of the
incident. Moreira tried to downplay the report as if nothing seri-
ous had happened. To quell the gravity of the accusation and
calm public opinion, General Moreira attributed the incident to
the "hyper-sensitivity of the UMOPAR."' 08 It is unlikely that
Moreira's statement had an ameliorating effect on those con-
cerned with the dispute. In fact, the general's reaction had an
opposite effect.
In political circles, General Afiez's reply to Moreira's com-
plaint was interpreted as too nonchalant as well as untimely. Co-
incidently, a bloody occurrence in the Chapare village of Isinuta
raised suspicions of further army aggressions against the
UMOPAR. A hand grenade hurled at a UMOPAR officer sitting
at a bar killed the agent and four civilians, including a four year
106 Id.
1 7 ANF News Agency (La Paz), May 17, 1990.
los ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 22, 1990).
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old child, and wounded several bystanders. 10 9 The assassin was
found drunk a few hours later by an enraged mob which burned
him to death in a hair-raising execution. The man was a well
known "desperado" with links to drug traffickers from Santa
Cruz. Although the incident was horrifying, it could have been
passed off as an inconsequential felony; an act of sheer lunacy.
Nevertheless, UMOPAR officers and regular policemen con-
ducting the investigation grew increasingly suspicious that the
military stationed in the Chapare had been behind the event.
Examination of the grenade shrapnel indicated that the explo-
sive was of the type to which only the army has access.11°
UMOPAR personnel in the Chapare conjectured that this crimi-
nal onslaught was designed to demonstrate that the UMOPAR
was unable to control the situation, thereby compelling army
intervention.
Despite theories as to the origin of the grenade, it is possible
that suspicions of military officers' involvement in the quadruple
murder were exaggerated. However, the apparently senseless
Mariani and helicopters affairs gave much credence to the
UMOPAR's misgivings. At the end of May 1990, there was a
generalized conviction among the UMOPAR that they would
have to safeguard themselves from any treachery that soldiers
from the Barrientos or the Ustariz could unleash."' Several poli-
ticians attributed this grim picture of joint UMOPAR-Army en-
deavors to the United States Embassy. Bolivian Congressman
Gregorio Lanza claims that Americans in Bolivia not only
brought about - but also set the pace of - the UMOPAR/
Army confrontation. Congressman Lanza asserts that Americans
have done this by urging the policy of military intervention in
Bolivia, and by usurping such decisions as which regiments or
forces to deploy and the role they were to play.' 12
10' Interview with Enrique Valverde, supra note 103. An interview with a regular
police officer investigating the case who asked not to be identified (May 29, 1990).
11 An oral report was submitted to one of the top officers in the Chimor6 training
course "Garras del Valor" by a regular policeman commissioned to probe the incident on
May 28, 1990. The author was present at that meeting.
Conversation between Valverde, a NAU agent called Gustavo and the unidenti-
fied police officer conducting the investigation. Interview in Villa Tunari, Chapare (May
30, 1990).
112 See G. Lanza, Policia, Fuerzas Armadas y Trafico de Drogas, PRESENCIA, La Paz,
at 8 (Apr. 28, 1990).
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IV. BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE WAR: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
The reputation of the UMOPAR and the DEA agents in
Bolivia remains controversial. Inhabitants of the Beni, the
Chapare and the Yungas accuse the UMOPAR of harassment
and pillage performed with DEA support."3 This view, repeat-
edly espoused by coca growers, has been backed by the Bolivian
Senate" 4 and large sectors of the Catholic Church. The citizenry
of the Beni, including farmers and businessmen, issued a strong
condemnation against UMOPAR procedures claiming they
posed a serious risk to innocent inhabitants of the region. "5
The Government's responses clearly suggest that the accu-
sations are true. The administration's Under-Secretary of Social
Defense, Gonzalo Torrico, reacted by blaming the traffickers for
what he deemed were slanderous charges against the "Special
Forces.""' 6 In contradicting Under-Secretary Torrico, Interior
Minister Guillermo Capobianco flatly admitted that the
UMOPAR had perpetrated abuses against the populace in the
Chapare and the Beni. Capobianco advised the UMOPAR per-
sonnel in the Chapare to have "more respect for civilians" given
the well-grounded accusations that the force had been abusing
women and illegally "hindering trade."'"7
In October 1990, Bolivian Congressman Julio Mantilla Cuel-
lar publicly declared that the UMOPAR had been exacting mon-
ies from coca growers in the province of the Yungas. Mantilla
Cuellar formally requested that the Interior Ministry inform the
I's Interview with E. Morales, supra note 75; interview with two unidentified mem-
bers of the San Miguel's "cocaleros union," (Sept. 16, 1989). See also W. WALKER III,
DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS 200 (1989).
." The Bolivian Senate probed thirty-two cases of pillage and "other abuses" in the
Beni. Human rights organizations promoted the investigation of further abuses. Accord-
ing to the Senate's spokesman, none of these allegations were answered by the heads of
the UMOPAR. PRESENCIA, La Paz (Apr. 13, 1990).
' See PRESENCIA, La Paz (Dec. 13, 1989).
PRESENCIA, La Paz (Mar. 17, 1990).
"7 See Minister Capobianco's address to UMOPAR officers in the Chapare,
Presencia (La Paz), Mar. 16, 1990. Observers of the Chapare acknowledge today that the
brunt of indiscriminate police repression is almost exclusively borne by poor "cocaleros"
and the landless labor force in the Chapare region. See, e.g., M. PAINTER, INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CRDP) 42 (The Institute
for Development Anthropology, Clark University, Worcester, Mass)(1990).
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Lower House of Congress about reported cases of torture and
property invasion perpetrated by the UMOPAR. 11 8 Additionally,
the Congressman sarcastically requested information about the
UMOPAR's authority to collect taxes. 119
As the last decades of Bolivian history have demonstrated,
the already existing infringement on the public liberties of the
peasants can be expected to worsen as a consequence of any
army intervention. The "unnecessary violence" to which Paz
Zamora referred as a reason for keeping the military out of anti-
drug enforcement 20 clearly implies that "taxes" upon peasants
as well as extra violence will march with the army into the
Chapare.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The issue of military involvement in the "war on drugs"
poses inescapable paradoxes to the Bolivian government. Ac-
quiesing to United States pressure to have the Bolivian army
join the fight against cocaine trafficking would satisfy American
expectations. It would also lend credence to the Bolivian govern-
ment's stated goal to combat the drug trade. By calling in the
army, Paz Zamora demonstrated his administration's resolution
to take the bull by the horns, once and for all. On the other
hand, this apparent solution to drug trafficking poses a dilemma:
to justify the army's intervention, the Bolivian government
would have to admit that the "Special Forces" have failed to
control drug trafficking. This admission would convey a poor im-
age of the "Special Forces" enforcement abilities. If the govern-
ment continued to claim that their special forces' efforts in the
drug war have been successful, there would be no apparent rea-
son to "militarize" enforcement. To be "doing well" in drug en-
forcement while concurrently militarizing anti-cocaine traffick-
ing endeavors for the purpose of improving drug enforcement
capabilities is visibly contradictory.
Those factions responsible for the control of the police have
gloated over their success in preventing the army's intervention
in the drug wars. Other members of the government vary in
PRESENCIA, La Paz (Oct. 1, 1990).
119 Id.
120 ULTIMA HORA, La Paz (May 8, 1990).
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their views of the situation. The varying evaluations about the
need for the army's intervention and the degree of support for
the United States position have little to do with the real
problems of fighting cocaine trafficking and much to do with the
politics of sectoral interests.
The apparent increase in power the military lends to control
the cocaine trade, has caused unrest among other branches of
drug enforcement. As a new, well-defined interest group to the
players involved in fighting the so-called war, the army has col-
lided with the UMOPAR and the DEA and eventually will con-
flict with the navy. The army's initial involvement in the
Chapare brought about clashes with the UMOPAR, followed by
open quarrels at the upper echelons of the forces. Conflict
among the enforcers has taken the place of cooperation and may
hinder any efforts to combat trafficking.
Eventually, the military will move back into a central politi-
cal position as the breadth and weight of the cocaine problem in
Bolivia increases. Presumably, this will lead to the deterioration
of the already weak, newly-established democratic institutions.
In addition, the recent involvement of high-ranking army offi-
cials in the cocaine business demonstrates the tendency of mili-
tary officers to establish alliances with drug traffickers. It is in
all likelihood that a new cocaine dictatorship similar to that of
General Garcia Meza may reign once more in Bolivia.
The army's intervention is unwarranted. The failure of en-
forcement is not the consequence of the personnel or means em-
ployed in the drug war to date.121 Rather, it is the result of the
misconceived war policy.
Bolivian coca growers have endured extreme violence from
the army in the 1970's and early 1980's, and from the UMOPAR
now. Political determination to end such violence is likely to be
more ineffective as additional agencies are thrown into the war
on drugs, especially if one these agencies is the army.
121 Malamud Goti, supra note 7.
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